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Four studies show that moral identity reduces people’s aversion to giving time—particularly as the
psychological costs of doing so increase. In Study 1, we demonstrate that even when the cost of time and
money are held equivalent, a moral cue enhances the expected self-expressivity of giving time—
especially when it is given to a moral cause. We found that a moral cue reduces time aversion even when
giving time was perceived to be unpleasant (Study 2), or when the time to be given was otherwise seen
to be scarce (Study 3). Study 4 builds on these studies by examining actual giving while accounting for
the real costs of time. In this study, we found that the chronic salience of moral identity serves as a buffer
to time aversion, specifically as giving time becomes increasingly costly. These findings are discussed
in terms of the time-versus-money literature and the identity literature. We also discuss policy implica-
tions for prosocial cause initiatives.
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The best way to find yourself is to lose yourself in service to others.
—Mahatma Gandhi
Waste your money and you’re only out of money, but waste your time
and you’ve lost a part of your life.
—Michael LeBoeuf
It is the nature of the strong heart . . . it strives ever upward, even
when it is most burdened.
—Phillip Sydney
How do we determine whether to donate money or give time to
prosocial causes? Money and time are valuable resources with
different psychological properties (Mogilner, 2010; Okada &
Hoch, 2004). Although spending money has been shown to pro-
mote happiness (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008), especially when
spent in particular ways (Aknin, Sandstrom, Dunn, & Norton,
2011; Dunn, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2011; Dunn & Norton, 2013),
simply thinking about money leads to antisocial behaviors such as
being more self-focused, less helpful and fair toward others, and
less sensitive to social exclusion (DeVoe & Pfeffer, 2007; Vohs,
Mead, & Goode, 2008; Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009). By
contrast, giving time to help others is also associated with dis-
tinctly prosocial outcomes. Giving time creates stronger interper-
sonal connections and other-focused behaviors (Liu & Aaker,
2008; Mogilner, 2010; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007), leads to
self-reflection and a reduction in cheating behaviors (Gino &
Mogilner, 2014), and boosts perceived time affluence and self-
efficacy. Giving time enables us to commit to future engagements
with greater confidence and enthusiasm (Mogilner, Chance, &
Norton, 2012). As a result, giving time leads to happiness and
well-being (Aaker, Rudd, & Mogilner, 2011), and as the first quote
by Gandhi suggests, may indeed be one of the deepest ways one
can self-actualize.
Despite the benefits of giving time, it is associated with a
number of perceived psychological costs. Compared with money,
time is harder to account for and is less fungible (Okada & Hoch,
2004; Saini & Monga, 2008; Zauberman & Lynch, 2005). People
can spend their time doing lots of different things, but choosing
what to do imposes a particular kind of opportunity cost by
preventing them from doing other things. Although spending
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money also has opportunity costs, it is possible to exponentially
increase one’s pool of money. However, because we are all mortal,
everyone’s time is limited, and both the pauper and the billionaire
are allotted the same 24 hr in a day to do what it is they want.
Importantly, as the second quote by Michael LeBoeuf suggests,
once these hours are lost they cannot be recovered. Time and
money also differ because even though people are generally will-
ing to exchange money with just about anybody, time is a more
particularistic resource (Foa & Foa, 1980), meaning people are
much more selective when deciding with whom to exchange it.
The differences between time and money just described lead us to
propose a psychological principle that influences the willingness to
expend time versus money on social causes: all else being equal,
the psychological costs associated with giving time should make
people less willing to give time than money in service to a social
cause. We refer to this phenomenon as time aversion. By social
cause, we mean any activity that requires a person to expend time
or money voluntarily to benefit others. We focus on time aversion
in the contexts of social causes because, it is when giving time on
behalf of others that people tend to reap a variety of psychological
benefits.
If indeed there are significant psychological benefits to giving
time, yet a corresponding aversion to doing so, then time aversion
may be a somewhat maladaptive psychological response—one
with significant social consequences. An important question that
emerges from this tension is, what factors lessen time aversion?
Else put, what can be done to steer us away from this sociopsy-
chological malady? In this article, we argue that “moral identity”
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003)—either when
primed or chronically salient—can play such a role. Our central
premise is that moral identity can lessen time aversion because
people behave in ways that affirm and reinforce their identities.
Accordingly, a strong moral identity may reduce time aversion not
despite the higher cost of giving time but rather because of it. Put
another way, giving time more strongly reinforces the moral self
compared with giving money (Reed et al., 2007). Therefore, like
the third quote by Sydney suggests, moral identity may be one
source of a strong heart– that is, a powerful motivator that reduces
time aversion, especially as doing so becomes more and more
psychologically costly.
We present four studies that show the effect of moral identity on
reducing time aversion. In Study 1, we demonstrate that even when
the cost of time and money are held equivalent, a moral cue
enhances the expected self-expressivity of giving time—especially
when it is given to a moral cause. This suggests that even though
giving time can in fact be costly, when people’s moral identities
are salient they may come to perceive it as less so, thereby helping
them overcome their time aversion. The next two studies were
designed to be stronger tests of the effect of moral identity on time
aversion. In both studies we directly manipulated the psycholog-
ical costs of giving time and examined people’s self-reported
preferences to give time (vs. money), as well as their expected
reactions. We found that a moral cue reduced time aversion even
when giving time was perceived to be unpleasant (Study 2), or
when the time to be given was otherwise seen to be scarce (Study
3). Together, these two studies show that the effect of moral
identity on time aversion is at least partially driven by an altered
perception of the unpleasantness of time as well as an anticipated
connection to those who receive the time. Study 4 builds on these
studies by examining actual giving while accounting for the real
costs of time. In this study, we found that the chronic salience of
moral identity serves as a buffer to time aversion, especially as
giving time becomes increasingly costly (e.g., scarce).
The main theoretical contribution of this article is that it con-
nects the (a) time-versus-money, and (b) identity-research streams,
and shows how they complement and inform one another. Al-
though some prior work suggests that an activated moral identity
may create greater self-reported preferences to give time over
money (Reed et al., 2007), this article explores the boundary
conditions of giving time under conditions in which doing so is
particularly difficult. This contribution is important from both
conceptual and practical perspectives. Conceptually, it enriches
both the time-versus-money and identity research streams by pro-
viding insights that neither could provide on its own. For instance,
the time-versus-money literature shows that time fosters greater
interpersonal connection than money does (Mogilner, 2010;
Mogilner et al., 2012), yet adding an understanding of how the act
can and cannot reinforce an identity (Laverie, Kleine, & Kleine,
2002) allows us to predict what might motivate people to over-
come the psychological barriers to doing so. On the other hand, the
identity literature argues that moral identity motivates people to
connect with and help others (Reed & Aquino, 2003), yet adding
time-versus-money research allows us to better predict how people
seek to connect: by giving time or money. Pragmatically speaking,
donors, recipients, and society at large all benefit when people
decide to give time, yet many people seem to have a strong
aversion to this, especially as the costs of doing so increase. Thus,
understanding how and what factors can overcome time aversion is
an important research issue with real-world import.
This article proceeds as follows. First, we describe our theoret-
ical framework and review relevant background literature. Second,
we present four studies that together demonstrate and provide
evidence for the effect of moral identity on time aversion. Finally,
we conclude with a discussion of future research directions and
implications for practical issues, such as persuasion for charitable
organizations and public policy initiatives.
Theoretical Framework
Time Is an Important Psychological Resource That
People Are Averse to Giving
The time-and-money literature suggests that giving or just think-
ing about time (compared with giving money) has significant
psychological benefits. For example, Mogilner et al. (2012) found
that when participants recalled a situation in which they spent time
on others (compared with a condition in which they recalled
spending time on themselves), they reported significantly higher
reactions of feeling capable, competent and useful (Experiment 3,
p. 1236). Priming the concept of time makes people more self-
reflective and reduces cheating behaviors (Gino & Mogilner,
2014). And because of its connection to forming meaningful
experiences (Carter & Gilovich, 2010; Van Boven & Gilovich,
2003), giving time is closely associated with happiness and well-
being (Mogilner, 2010). However, time is a particularistic resource
with a unique opportunity cost associated with its finite supply
(Foa & Foa, 1980; Reed & Aquino, 2003). This means that when
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2 REED, KAY, FINNEL, AQUINO, AND LEVY
it comes to giving time, the qualities of the person receiving the
resource and the nature of the relationship between the giver and
the receiver matters. As a result, people are more likely to spend
time on close rather than distant others (Reed & Aquino, 2003).
This may be one reason why simply priming the concept of time
(compared with money) makes people more likely to plan to spend
time with family and friends (Mogilner, 2010). It also makes them
more likely to actually socialize instead of work (Mogilner, 2010,
Experiment 2, p. 1352). Therefore, giving time imposes a kind of
unique psychological cost in the sense that it demands some ability
to relate to and care about the beneficiary. This is why we might
be more miserly about giving time to strangers than money,
especially as the perceived pace of life accelerates (Levine, 2008).
Put another way, giving time is psychologically more demanding
than giving money. Thus, as time is a unique and precious resource
that once lost can never be recovered, people may have a signif-
icant aversion to giving it away, especially to strangers or distant
others (Reed & Aquino, 2003).
People Are Less Time Averse When Giving Time
Reinforces Identity
This article asks the question, what might help a person over-
come time aversion — especially as the psychological costs of
giving time increase? The answer may partially lie in the extent to
which the act of giving time is or is not reflective of and rooted in
a person’s identity. Research shows that both situational cues and
individual differences can activate particular identities or aspects
of the self (Reed, 2004). Once these identities are activated, people
then seek to reinforce them through identity consistent behaviors
(Oyserman, 2007). One of the reasons they do so is to affirm for
themselves and express to others that they hold that identity. A
study by Laverie et al. (2002) found that an identity becomes more
important to the self when “more opportunities exist to enact and
receive feedback from others (social commitments),” and “more
positive and self-enhancing feedback is experienced” (p. 668).
This independent appraisal mechanism is at least one way in which
we determine whether our behaviors are consistent with our iden-
tities, and one way in which we assess different kinds of behaviors
that have the strongest ability to strengthen our self-image (Kleine,
Kleine, & Kernan, 1993; Laverie et al., 2002; Solomon, 1983). It
is well accepted that people have multiple identities (Ashmore,
Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004). This begs the question, what
identity might be reinforced by giving time to prosocial causes? In
response to this question, this article places moral identity center
stage.
Moral Identity Reduces Time Aversion Even As the
Cost of Time Increases
Broadly defined, morality is a meaning system of principles and
values that determine what is right and wrong, and what is good or
bad, conduct for an individual and/or society. Definitions of mo-
rality can vary across different cultures (Graham, Meindl, & Beall,
2012),1 as well as the extent to which an individual may ascribe
these values to the moral dimensions of their own identity (Blasi,
1984). We define moral identity as a self-schema organized around
a set of moral traits (e.g., fair, honest, kind)—traits that commonly
come to people’s minds when they are asked what it means to be
moral (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Moral-identity activation varies
across situations. Consistent with trait activation theory (Tett &
Burnett, 2003), situational cues can activate moral identity. This
brings moral identity to the forefront of peoples’ minds and
prompts them to act consistently with it (Finnel, Reed, & Aquino,
2011). In addition to being triggered by situational cues, the
chronic salience of moral identity (e.g., how important this identity
is to a person’s self-definition) varies across individuals (Aquino
& Reed, 2002). The higher the chronic salience, the more easily
moral identity is activated (see Higgins, 1996), and the more it
motivates moral judgments and behaviors (Aquino & Reed, 2002).
Thus, both situational cues and individual differences may trigger
cognitions and behaviors that reflect compassion, kindness, and
other traits associated with moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002).
As moral cognitions and behaviors lead people to seek human
connection (Reed & Aquino, 2003), they may become more will-
ing to spend time on strangers or distant others. Accordingly, this
may reduce their default aversion to doing so. Hence, our central
premise is that the subjective experience of a strong moral identity,
whether this state is chronic or temporarily primed, can diminish
time aversion because people are more likely to behave in ways
that affirm and reinforce this identity. As a result, people are more
likely to prefer giving time than money to a social cause precisely
because it is more costly to give. Put another way, compared with
giving money, giving time more strongly reinforces the moral self
(Reed et al., 2007) because it requires a greater expenditure of
effort and is a resource that, once given, cannot be taken back. We
contend that costly sacrifices that are consistent with one’s com-
mitment to a given identity– in this case a moral one– will be more
identity-reinforcing than less costly ones because it sends a stron-
ger, more definitive signal to the self and others that this identity
is experienced as being essential to one’s self-concept.
The Effect of Moral Identity on Time Aversion Is
Driven by Basic Human Needs
The effect of moral identity on time aversion is motivated by at
least two basic human needs: (a) the need for self-expression, and
(b) the need for human connection. Self-expressiveness is at least
one answer to the question of why moral identity reduces time
aversion. For instance, moral identity may drive people to show
that they are moral individuals who are compassionate, kind, and
so forth (Aquino & Reed, 2002).2 But how will people seek to
express their moral identity if they have many possible ways of
doing so? People faced with two options (e.g., giving time or
money) will be motivated via self-appraisal (Laverie et al., 2002)
to determine which one provides the most potent form of self-
expression. All things being equal, people will choose the option that
best reflects their self-image. People implicitly know that giving time
better reflects the traits associated with moral identity than donating
money does. As a result, those with a stronger moral identity will be
1 Graham et al. (2012) note that, given this complexity, research should
account for the extent to which a participant being observed would endorse
that the behavior being studied on them meets that definition. In all our
studies, we examine giving time or money to a prosocial cause, two acts
that are seen as moral behaviors by the samples we study in this article.
2 Research shows that moral character can be a critical component of
person perception, in some instances more important than emotional char-
acteristics such as “warmth” (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014).
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3MORAL IDENTITY & TIME AVERSION TO PROSOCIAL CAUSES
more likely to give time as opposed to money. It is simply a matter of
choosing the option that best reflects their self-image.
The need for human connection is another potential reason why
moral identity reduces time aversion. Interpersonal connection is a
fundamental human need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) that lies at the
core of numerous theories of motivation (i.e., Alderfer, 1969; Mc-
Clelland, 1961; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Giving time likely creates
stronger interpersonal connections than donating money does. Moral
identity has been shown to be an important motivational impetus to
connect and help others in need (Reed et al., 2007), thereby facilitat-
ing interpersonal connection. Moral identity has been found to be
associated with a stronger obligation to help not only in-groups (e.g.,
friends and family) but also out-groups (e.g., strangers; Reed &
Aquino, 2003). Because moral identity encourages people to connect
with others (Reed & Aquino, 2003), and because giving time is more
connecting than donating money is, it may be that moral identity
reduces time aversion and may be particularly likely to do so as the
psychological costs of time increase.
Summary of Predictions and Empirical Work
To summarize, we expect moral identity—whether situationally
activated or chronically accessible—to reduce time aversion. We
test the effect of moral identity on time aversion via two main
predictions. First, we predict that moral identity enhances the
expected self-expressivity of giving time as well as the anticipated
connection with the recipient. Second, we predict that moral iden-
tity may reduce time aversion even as the psychological costs of
giving time increase. We argue that it is precisely when giving
time is costly that moral identity has its greatest effect on time
aversion, that is, moral identity may reduce time aversion not in
spite of the higher costs of giving time, but because of them (see
Oyserman, 2007).
Study 1: A Moral Cue Reduces Time Aversion
Because Giving Time to a Moral Cause Aligns the Act
With One’s Identity
Study Overview
Study 1 tests an underlying core assumption of this article. The
aversion to giving time can be reduced by moral identity—and that
one reason this can happen is that giving time (compared with money)
has inherently stronger self-expressive properties. This can potentially
align moral identity with giving time. Therefore, we predict that
people will expect the giving of time to be more self-expressive
especially when the time is allocated to a moral purpose, and that this
reduction in time aversion is enhanced in the presence of a moral cue.
The study is a 2 (moral identity activated vs. not activated) 2 (moral
vs. nonmoral cause) between-subjects design. One hundred sixty-
eight panel members at a university behavioral lab (students, admin-
istrative staff, and local area community residents; 55 males, 113
females) completed three tasks: (a) a general opinion survey that
measured impression management, (b) a handwriting task containing
the moral-identity-activation manipulation, and (c) a hypothetical
donation request capturing self-reported preferences to give time
versus money. After these and other unrelated tasks, participants were
paid $10 and debriefed.
Moral-Identity Activation
The moral-identity activation manipulation was a writing task
(see the Appendices for all measures and manipulations used in
this article and contact the authors for the stimuli). The task’s
purpose was purportedly “to examine people’s handwriting
styles.” Participants received nine words, copied each one four
times, and wrote a story about themselves that used each one at
least once. In the moral-identity-activated condition, the words
were traits that people commonly associate with being a moral
person (Aquino & Reed, 2002; e.g., kind). In the moral-identity-
not-activated condition, the words were positive traits unrelated to
morality (e.g., polite; see Appendix A for this manipulation). After
writing their story, respondents completed manipulation checks
and questions that bolstered the cover story. The manipulation
checks revealed that participants in the moral-identity-activated
(not-activated) condition thought their stories were more (less)
reflective of how they saw themselves as moral people (MNotActi-
vated  4.68, MActivated  5.40), F(1, 161)  6.26, p  .05, p2 
.04.
Hypothetical Donation Request
After the handwriting task, participants completed an ostensibly
unrelated hypothetical donation request. They were told that the
American Marketing Association (AMA) wished to assess peo-
ple’s perceptions of, and desire to, volunteer different kinds of
resources for fundraising efforts. Participants read about a partic-
ular AMA fundraising effort. Participants then completed study
measures.
Morality of the cause. We manipulated the morality of the
cause. In the moral-cause condition, the AMA was purportedly
developing a grassroots community campaign to raise awareness
of the need for college students to get involved early in volunteer
activities (e.g., promoting human rights). In the nonmoral-cause
condition, the AMA was purportedly developing an advertisement
and persuasive communication campaign to promote and sell
marketing services to companies. Because aid recipients are rela-
tively needier in the first case, we reasoned that the first cause
would be perceived as relatively more moral (see Appendix B for
this manipulation). Manipulation checks completed at the end
of the study confirmed this: compared with participants in the
nonmoral-cause condition, those in the moral-cause condition
believed their resources would be going to a more moral cause
(MNonMoralCause  2.40, MMoralCause  3.78), F(1, 160) 
25.54, p  .001, p2  .13.
Self-expressiveness. Participants indicated how much they
agreed (1  strongly disagree, 7  strongly agree) with 10
statements concerning the extent to which giving to the cause
would be self-expressive (e.g., “Participating in this fundraising
effort would reflect the type of person that I am”;   .95; see
Appendix C for this measure).
Donation preferences. Participants then imagined that they
came to the lab one day and were given three options for aiding the
cause: donate $5 (they would give $5 of their $10 compensation
for the day’s session to the cause), donate $5 worth of their time
(they had no preexisting obligations and would spend time after
the session helping with mailings for the cause), or do neither.
They then indicated what they would likely do (1  “No Thanks!
I prefer not to donate”; the midpoint  “Donate $5 in cash
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4 REED, KAY, FINNEL, AQUINO, AND LEVY
money”; 10  “Donate $5 worth of my time”), such that larger
numbers reflected a relatively higher preference for giving time
versus money.3
Control variables. We controlled for four variables (age, gen-
der, religious participation, and impression management) that may
influence preferences for giving time versus money (Gilligan, 1982;
Myers, 2000; Paulhus, 1989; Putnam, 2000; Reed et al., 2007).
Results
Self-expressiveness. Table 1 shows means, standard devia-
tions, and correlations among all study variables. The first analysis
was an ANOVA predicting self-expressiveness of giving. The
predictors were the control variables, the main effects of the
moral-identity-activation condition and the moral-cause condition,
and the Moral Identity Condition  Moral Cause interaction. A
positive main effect of impression management emerged, F(1,
159)  12.96, p  .01, p2  .08. We also found a main effect of
moral-identity activation (activating moral identity increased self-
expressiveness), F(1, 159)  18.30, p  .001, p2  .10, and a
main effect of the moral cause manipulation (making the cause
moral increased self-expressiveness), F(1, 159) 25.89, p .001,
p2  .14. However, more important to our key predictions, we
found a Moral Identity Condition  Moral Cause interaction, F(1,
159)  4.89, p  .05, p2  .03. Follow-up analyses showed that
activating moral identity increased the perceived self-
expressiveness of giving, but only when the cause was moral, F(1,
159)  22.98, p  .001, p2  .13, rather than nonmoral, F(1,
159)  2.44, ns (see Figure 1, left panel).
Donation preferences. We ran an ANOVA predicting dona-
tion preferences, using exactly the same predictors as in the self-
expressiveness analysis. A positive main effect of impression
management emerged, F(1, 162)  16.16, p  .001, p2  .09. We
also found a main effect of moral-identity activation (activating
moral identity pushed participants toward time and away from
nothing), F(1, 162) 29.87, p .001, p2  .16, and a main effect
of the moral-cause manipulation (making the cause moral pushed
participants toward time and away from nothing), F(1, 162) 
40.40, p  .001, p2  .20. However, these two effects were
qualified by a Moral Identity Condition  Moral Cause interac-
tion, F(1, 162)  12.69, p  .001, p2  .07, which followed a
pattern similar to that for self-expressiveness. Activating moral
identity pushed participants toward giving time, particularly when
the cause was moral, F(1, 162) 42.17, p .001, p2  .21, rather
than nonmoral, F(1, 162)  1.62, ns (see Figure 1, right panel).
Mediated moderation. To test whether self-expressiveness
mediated participants’ donation preferences, we used Muller, Judd,
and Yzerbyt’s (2005) procedure, which updates Baron and Ken-
ny’s (1986) approach to account for higher order interaction mod-
erator effects. According to Muller et al. (2005), establishing
mediated moderation requires estimating parameters for three re-
gression models shown in Table 2 (referred to as Models 4, 5, and
6, in their terminology). Mediated moderation can be concluded
when (a) the first model shows that the Moral Identity Condition
Moral Cause interaction significantly predicts preferences to give
time versus money, (b) the second model shows this same signif-
icant effect on self-expressiveness, (c) the third model shows that
the effect of self-expressiveness on preference to give time versus
money is significant, and (d) the Moral Identity Condition 
Moral Cause interaction in the third model is reduced in magnitude
(or rendered nonsignificant) compared with the same parameter
estimated in the first model. Throughout this article, continuous
independent variables were mean centered to minimize multicol-
linearity (Aiken & West, 1991).
As Table 2 shows, Muller et al.’s (2005) criteria for mediated
moderation were met. Specifically, partial mediated moderation
emerged, as indicated by the significant mediator in the third
model and the two-way interaction’s decrease in magnitude from
the first to the third model.
Mediated moderation follow-up. To better understand this
pattern of results, we tested for simple mediation at different levels
of the moral-cause moderator (Muller et al., 2005, p. 861). First,
we regressed the control variables and the moral-identity-
activation condition onto self-expressiveness at each level of the
moral-cause manipulation. This analysis revealed that activating
moral identity increased the perceived self-expressiveness of giv-
ing in the moral-cause condition, b 1.21, t(81) 5.19, p .001,
but not in the nonmoral-cause condition, b  0.46, t(75)  1.44,
ns. We also conducted the same two regressions but with prefer-
ence to give time-versus-money (rather than self-expressiveness)
as the dependent variable. We found the same pattern of results,
such that activating moral identity increased preferences to give
time versus money in the moral-cause condition, b 3.65, t(81)
6.25, p  .001, but not in the nonmoral-cause condition, b  0.87,
t(75)  1.50, ns. A final analysis examined the simple effect of
moral-identity activation on donation preferences at each level
of the moral-cause manipulation while controlling for the self-
expressiveness mediator. We found that the partial mediated moder-
ation effect is driven by a simple partial mediation effect in the
moral-cause condition: in the moral-cause condition, activating moral
3 We conducted a separate out-of-sample analysis to test whether or not
having time  10, and money  5 changed participants perceived “value”
of either resource. Three hundred (N  330) participants were randomly
assigned to a 2 (morality of cause: low vs. high)  2 (scale order: time at
high end vs. money at high end)  2 (question order of the dependent
variable: time valuation first vs. money valuation first) between-subjects
design. All participants answered questions about how much their time
(  .82) and their money (  .83) were worth to them as part of a cover
story involving reactions to future measures to be used in a study (more
details from this analysis are available from the first author). To test
whether our scale influenced participants’ valuation of time versus money,
we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with valuation of time and
valuation of money as the within-subjects repeated measure, and with the
morality of the cause, the scale order, and the question order as between-
subjects variables. All higher order interactions were included in the
analysis. In addition, we controlled for the same main effects of age,
gender, and religious participation that we controlled for in all of the
studies reported in this article. If the scale order influenced participants’
valuations of time and money, leading them to value time relatively more
than money, we would expect to see a significant two-way interaction
between the within-subjects repeated measure and the scale order: partic-
ipants would value time more than they value money when time is at the
high end of the scale, but would value money more than they value time
when money is at the high end of the scale. In our analysis, this two-way
interaction was not significant, F(1, 327)  0.41, p  .52. This evidence
shows that our scale most likely did not influence participants’ relative
valuation of time versus money. Interestingly, it is important to note that
these results show that there is no bias of implicit higher valuation for
either resource (time nor money) when it is placed at the upper end of the
continuous scale.
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5MORAL IDENTITY & TIME AVERSION TO PROSOCIAL CAUSES
identity triggers increased self-expressiveness that partially mediates
an increased preference to give time versus money.
Discussion
This study provides evidence that activating moral identity
reduces the aversion to giving time, especially to a moral cause of
which the beneficiaries are strangers or distant others. It also
shows that one of the drivers of this reduction in time aversion is
that people perceive giving time to be more self-expressive, but
only when the cause is moral. Therefore, this study suggests that
people are less time averse when presented with an opportunity to
give time to a moral cause, especially when their morality identity
is activated, and a key reason for this is that they see their efforts
to be more self-expressive. This is consistent with our premise that
giving time (especially to a moral cause) is more reinforcing to
one’s moral identity compared with giving money.
This study on its own provides only tentative, preliminary evidence
of the buffering effect of moral identity on time aversion and the
factors that drive it. Although the desire for self-expression may
be one source of motivation that reduces time aversion, there may be
others. This study provides a promising yet limited glimpse of what
the drivers behind this process might be. In addition, this study gives
little insight into the effect of moral identity on time aversion in the
face of increasing psychological costs. In this study, participants were
asked to consider performing a relatively innocuous task (i.e., sorting
mail) for a subjectively determined period of time. Many forms of
prosocial giving are far more psychologically demanding than this.
Therefore, the next study was designed to specifically test the predic-
tion that moral identity buffers against time aversion even in the face
of psychologically demanding tasks.
Study 2: A Moral Cue Reduces Time Aversion When
the Task Required of One’s Time Is Unpleasant
Study Overview
This study’s purpose is to directly manipulate the psychological
cost of time. Participants were led to believe that giving time
involved relatively neutral tasks (e.g., filing papers at a hospital) or
relatively unpleasant ones (e.g., emptying bedpans at a hospital).
This time cost manipulation is useful because it may allow people to
adjust their perceptions of the costs in a motivated fashion. Although
Table 1
Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Amongst Independent and Dependent Variables
Variable(s)
 M SD A G RP IM MIC MC SE DC
Independent variable(s)
A 23.9 8.0 —
G .13 —
RP 2.41 2.49 .02 .08 —
IM 3.19 .42 .41 .19 .03 —
MIC .53 .67 .09 .04 .00 — —
MC .52 .50 .07 .04 .08 .00 .03 —
SE 3.78 .50 .12 .11 .10 .30 .31 .36 —
Dependent variables
DC 4.21 3.32 .00 .08 .11 .25 .37 .41 .71 —
Note. A Age; G Gender; RP Religious Participation; IM Impression Management; MICMoral Identity Condition; MCMoral Cause; SE
Self-Expressiveness; DC  Donation Choice.
 p  .10.  p  .05.  p  .001.
Figure 1. Study 1: Activating moral identity leads to higher perceived self-expressiveness of giving and to
higher self-reported preference for giving time when the cause is moral.
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6 REED, KAY, FINNEL, AQUINO, AND LEVY
virtually everyone would agree that emptying bedpans at a hospital is
unpleasant, people may adjust how pleasant they perceive the task to
be depending on their ability to resist the aversion to giving such time.
For example, someone who is highly motivated to give time may
reason that volunteering will have some pleasant components, such as
interacting with hospital patients. In this study, we propose that the
presence of a moral cue will lessen time aversion, and that participants
will perceive giving time as relatively more pleasant.
Drawn from a university behavioral lab panel, 238 participants (88
males, 144 females) were randomly assigned to a cell in a 2 (moral
identity activated vs. not activated)  2 (volunteering time high vs.
low on unpleasantness) between-subjects design. The study consisted
of two ostensibly unrelated tasks: the moral-identity activation task
from Study 2 and a donation task. After these and other unrelated
studies, participants were debriefed and paid $10.
Moral-Identity Activation
Moral identity was activated using slide shows. The cover story
stated that the task’s purpose was to assess the effectiveness of a
new software program designed to improve slide-show quality.
Participants were told that they would watch a randomly selected
slide show that had been modified using the software. Each slide
show contained music, pictures, and quotes. In the moral-identity-
activated condition, the pictures featured moral exemplars (e.g.,
Gandhi) and ordinary people helping each other, and the quotes
focused on the same ideas as the photos (e.g., “Wherever there is
a human being, there is a chance for kindness”). In the moral-
identity-not-activated condition, the pictures featured ordinary
people who were not helping each other (e.g., an elderly man), and
the quotes focused on human behavior but not on moral behavior
(e.g., “The search for human behavior is infinite. You’ll never
understand it all”; contact the authors for the stimuli). After the
slide show, participants completed manipulation checks and unre-
lated items that bolstered the cover story.
Donation Task
Participants first indicated how much 1 hr of their time was worth
to them in dollars. Next, they read about the nonprofit university
hospital on campus and imagined they were considering contributing
to it.
Then participants read a paragraph and saw photographs depict-
ing what they would do if they gave time. In the high-
unpleasantness condition, they learned that volunteering involved
spoon feeding severely ill patients and replacing dirty urine cups
and bedpans. In the low-unpleasantness condition, they learned
that volunteering involved tidying up and putting clipboards and
chairs in their proper place (see Appendix D for this manipulation;
contact the authors for the stimuli). In a pretest on a separate
sample (n  68), those exposed to the high (low) unpleasantness
condition rated volunteering as more (less) unpleasant (MHighUn-
pleasantness 3.91, MLowUnpleasantness 2.88), F(1, 63) 8.18, p
.01.
Next, participants indicated their donation preferences for giving
time versus money. They were told to consider three options: (a)
volunteering for 1 hr, (b) donating the equivalent of 1 hr in money (the
amount they wrote previously when asked how much one hour of
time was worth to them in dollars), or (c) doing nothing. Participants
indicated what they would most likely do on a 7-point scale (1  “I
would prefer to volunteer 1 hour of my time”; 4  “I would be
indifferent between volunteering 1 hour of my time and donating $___
of my money”; 7 “I would prefer to donate $___ of my money”). If
they preferred not to donate, they chose a separate option at the very
bottom of the page that read, “I would prefer NOT to give money or
time.” We reverse coded the item so that higher numbers corre-
sponded to a higher preference for giving time. In addition, we
restricted the sample to the 210 participants who said they would
contribute (as opposed to saying they would prefer not to contribute).
After making their choice, participants were asked to think back to the
information they received about volunteering time. They then rated
how pleasant it would be to volunteer time in that way (1 not at all
pleasant, 7  extremely pleasant).
Results
Main analysis. Table 3 shows means, standard deviations,
and correlations among the study’s main variables. We ran an
ANOVA predicting preferences for giving time versus money. The
predictors included all relevant control variables from Study 1
Table 2
Study 1: Self-Expressiveness Partially Mediates the Joint Effects of Moral Identity Activation
and Morality of the Cause on Donation Preferences
Variables
Model 4 (DV: Give time
vs. money)
Model 5 (DV: Self-
expressiveness)
Model 6 (DV: Give time
vs. money)
B t B t B t
A .023 .852 .013 .964 .033 1.42
G .313 .737 .163 .779 .024 .065
RP .071 .884 .034 .871 .026 .385
IM 1.84 3.74 .827 3.41 .812 1.85
MIC .811 1.42 .418 1.50 .323 .658
MC 1.12 1.95 .539 1.92 .574 1.125
MIC  MC 2.86 3.60 .899 2.32 1.49 2.03
SE — — — — .982 5.72
MIC  SE — — — — .463 1.74
Model R2 .40 — .30 — .58
Note. A  Age; G  Gender; RP  Religious Participation; IM  Impression Management; MIC  Moral
Identity Condition; MC  Morality of Cause; SE  Self-Expressiveness; DV  Dependent Variable.
 p  .10.  p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
7MORAL IDENTITY & TIME AVERSION TO PROSOCIAL CAUSES
(age, gender, religious participation, slide show quality, and agree-
ment with views promoted in the slide show), the moral-identity-
activation condition, the unpleasantness condition, and the Moral
Identity Activation  Unpleasantness interaction. The analysis
revealed a main effect of unpleasantness, such that participants in
the high-unpleasantness condition had a lower preference for giv-
ing time and hence a higher preference for giving money than
those in the low-unpleasantness condition, F(1, 201)  50.17, p 
.001, p2  .20. This effect was qualified by the predicted Moral
Identity Activation  Unpleasantness interaction, F(1, 201) 
7.73, p  .01, p2  .04. When volunteering time was high on
unpleasantness, activating moral identity increased preferences for
giving time versus money, F(1, 201)  6.74, p  .05, p2  .03.
However, when volunteering time was low on unpleasantness,
activating moral identity had no effect on preferences for giving
time versus money, F(1, 201)  0.45, ns (see Figure 2, left panel).
Process evidence. In this study, we also sought process evi-
dence as to how moral identity motivates volunteering time, espe-
cially when volunteering is unpleasant. Specifically, we reasoned that
moral identity could motivate volunteering time through its effects on
perceived task pleasantness. To test this idea, we ran a regression to
conduct a mediated moderation analysis and found that all of Muller
et al.’s (2005) criteria for mediated moderation were satisfied (see
Table 4).
Specifically, perceived task pleasantness partially mediates the
Moral Identity ActivationManipulated Unpleasantness interaction.
When volunteering time was manipulated to be high on unpleasant-
ness (but not when it was manipulated to be low on unpleasantness),
activating moral identity caused participants to view volunteering
time as less unpleasant (see Figure 2, right panel). This lower per-
ceived unpleasantness, in turn, shifted participants’ preferences away
from giving money and toward giving time.
Discussion
Study 2 lends further support for the notion that activating moral
identity reduces time aversion, yet it does so in the face of a specific
psychological cost: spending time on expressly unpleasant tasks. This
study also provides additional process evidence about the factors that
drive this effect– namely, a decrease in the perceived unpleasantness
Table 3
Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Amongst Independent and Dependent Variables
Variable(s)
 M SD A G RP MIC PC PP DC
Independent variable(s)
A 20.00 2.10 —
G .03 —
RP 1.24 1.11 .04 .02
MIC .47 .50 .02 .02 .05 —
PC .47 .50 .11 .08 .04 .04 —
PP 3.56 1.86 .12 .17 .10 .06 .44 —
Dependent variables
DC 3.58 2.57 .10 .02 .08 .01 .38 .54 —
Note. A  Age; G  Gender; RP  Religious Participation; MIC  Moral Identity Condition; PC  Pleasantness Condition; PP  Perceived
Pleasantness; DC  Donation Choice.
 p  .05.  p  .001.
Figure 2. Study 2: Activating moral identity shifts peoples’ preferences away from giving money and toward
giving time, and makes people perceive giving time as less unpleasant, but only when giving time is manipulated
to be highly unpleasant.
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8 REED, KAY, FINNEL, AQUINO, AND LEVY
of the tasks in question. Taken together, this study suggests that moral
identity reduces time aversion to unpleasant tasks because people
come to see these tasks as less unpleasant.
Although this study fosters further evidence in support of the
buffering effect of moral identity on time aversion and helps shed
light on the psychological processes that may drive it, it still leaves
underdeveloped our understanding of this effect. Task unpleasantness
may be one form of psychological cost that drives time aversion, but
most prosocial acts are not so unpleasant as cleaning dirty bedpans. In
the fast-paced world of today, a more universally applicable cost of
prosocial giving is the scarcity of time. In addition, we suspect that at
the heart of many prosocial acts is the desire to help another person.
These issues remained untouched by the first two studies. To account
for these deficiencies, we conducted Study 3.
Study 3: A Moral Cue Reduces Time Aversion When
Time Is Scarce Because Time Connects the Giver to
the Receiver
Study Overview
The purpose of this study is to directly manipulate the scarcity of
time versus money in order to see its effects on time aversion. We
predict that a moral cue will lessen time aversion when time is scarce,
and that this will be driven by the extent to which giving time provides
the giver an expected sense that they feel a connection to the indi-
viduals who will receive the aid. In the study, 268 participants (104
males, 162 females, 2 preferred not to answer) were randomly as-
signed to a cell in a 2 (moral identity activated vs. not activated)  2
(time scarce and money abundant vs. time abundant and money
scarce) between-subjects design. They completed a moral-identity-
activation task and an ostensibly unrelated donation task.
Moral-Identity Activation
We used the same slide show manipulation that we used in
Study 2. Compared with participants in the moral-identity-not-
activated condition, those in the moral-identity-activated condition
reported that the slide show made them reflect more on their
morality (MNotActivated  3.41, MActivated  4.61), F(1, 243) 
38.78, p  .001, p2  .14.
Donation Task
The second task was purportedly about how college students
manage time and money. Participants first indicated how much one
hour of their time was worth to them in dollars.
Scarcity manipulation. Next, participants imagined that they
were students and that they had a certain amount of time and
money this semester, with the amounts manipulated depending on
condition. Those in the time-scarce/money-abundant (time-
abundant/money-scarce) condition learned that they had some, but
not a lot of, spare time (money) and a lot of spare money (time; see
Appendix E for this manipulation). At the end of the study,
participants completed manipulation checks. As expected, partic-
ipants in the time-scarce/money-abundant condition (MSpareTime 
2.80, MSpareMoney  5.97) reported having less spare time, F(1,
238)  270.28, p  .001, p2  .53, and more spare money, F(1,
238)  265.97, p  .001, p2  .53, than those in the time-abundant/
money-scarce condition (MSpareTime  6.08, MSpareMoney  2.55).
Donation preferences. After the scarcity manipulation, partic-
ipants imagined that one day during the semester, they were asked to
give to the Global Fund, which fights AIDS, tuberculosis, and ma-
laria. The scale used was identical to the scale used in the previous
study. Because we were interested in preferences for donating time
versus money, and not in preferences for donating versus not donat-
ing, we excluded participants who said they would not contribute at
all, leaving 249 participants. For ease of presentation, we reverse
coded participants’ time-versus-money preference such that the
higher the number, the higher the preference to give time.
Expected connection to aid recipients. Participants indicated
their agreement with two statements about how connected they
would feel to aid recipients if they donated as they specified (e.g.,
“After making this choice, I would feel very connected to the
people benefiting from Global Fund aid”; 1  completely dis-
Table 4
Study 2: Perceived Pleasantness of Giving Time Partially Mediates the Joint Effects of Moral Identity Activation and Manipulated
Unpleasantness on Donation Preferences
Variables
Model 4 (DV: Give time vs.
money)
Model 5 (DV: Perceived task
pleasantness)
Model 6 (DV: Give time vs.
money)
B t B t B t
A .023 .329 .066 1.250 .037 .774
G .264 .864 .315 1.348 .036 .170
RP .214 1.629 .073 .725 .145 1.592
AG .053 .272 .069 .461 .118 .878
SQ .240 1.901 .264 2.739 .004 .047
MI .326 .672 .101 .272 .240 .713
PC 2.902 7.092 2.005 6.394 1.006 3.234
MI  PC 1.643 2.779 .969 2.139 .720 1.737
PP — — — — .903 9.742
PC  PP — — — — .076 .611
Model R2 .28 — .29 — .66 —
Note. DV  Dependent Variable; A  Age; G  Gender; RP  Religious Participation; AG  Agreement with Views in Slide Show; SQ  Slide Show
Quality; MIC  Moral Identity Condition; PC  Pleasantness Condition; PP  Perceived Pleasantness.
 p  .10.  p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
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9MORAL IDENTITY & TIME AVERSION TO PROSOCIAL CAUSES
agree, 7  completely agree). The responses were averaged ( 
.88; see Appendix F for this measure).
Control variables. The control variables included all Study 1
control variables, as well as slide show features that were rated as
different across the two moral-identity-activation conditions (e.g.,
photo quality, positive affect, agreement with views promoted in
the slide show).
Results
Donation preferences. Table 5 shows means, standard devi-
ations, and correlations among all study variables. We predicted
that those in the moral-identity-activated condition would show
evidence of decreased aversion to giving time compared with those
in the moral-identity-not-activated condition, especially when time
was scarce and money was abundant. We tested this hypothesis
with an ANOVA predicting donation preferences. The predictors
were the control variables, the moral-identity-activation condition,
the scarcity condition, and the Moral Identity Activation  Scar-
city interaction. We found a marginal main effect of age, such that
older participants had lower aversion to giving time versus money
than younger ones, F(1, 238)  2.85, p  .10, p2  .01, and a
main effect of scarcity condition, such that participants expressed
a lower aversion to giving whichever resource was less scarce,
F(1, 238)  41.05, p  .001, p2  .15. These effects were
qualified by a Moral Identity Activation  Scarcity interaction,
F(1, 238)  9.21, p  .01, p2  .04. When time was scarce and
money was abundant, participants in the moral-identity-activated
condition expressed lower aversion to giving time rather than
money more so than participants in the moral-identity-not-
activated condition, F(1, 238) 8.29, p .01, p2  .03. However,
aversion to giving time versus money was similar across the
moral-identity-activation conditions when time was abundant and
money was scarce, F(1, 238)  0.88, ns (see Figure 3).
Connection to aid recipients. We predicted that participants
who had expressed a lower aversion to giving time rather than
money would expect to feel more connected to aid recipients,
particularly when moral identity was activated. To test this hy-
pothesis, we ran a hierarchical regression predicting expected
connection to aid recipients with the following predictors: (a) the
control variables (Step 1); (b) preference for donating time versus
money, moral-identity-activation condition, and scarcity condition
(Step 2); and (c) all higher order interactions among the variables
in Step 2 (Step 3). We found a main effect of gender, such that
women felt more connected to aid recipients than men did, b 
0.50, t(233)  2.65, p  .01, p2 in corresponding ANOVA  .03.
A main effect of donation preference also emerged, such that
participants expected to be more connected to aid recipients as
they expressed a lower aversion to giving time rather than money,
b  0.31, t(233)  4.15, p  .001, p2 in corresponding
ANOVA  .13. This effect was qualified by a Donation Prefer-
ence  Moral Identity Activation interaction, b  0.30, t(233) 
2.73, p  .01, p2 in corresponding ANOVA  .03.
Following up on the interaction (Aiken & West, 1991; Irwin &
McClelland, 2001), we found that participants expected to be
connected to aid recipients as the aversion to giving time de-
creased, particularly when moral identity was activated (moral
identity activated, b  0.61, t(233)  7.38, p  .001; moral
identity not activated, b  0.31, t(233)  4.15, p  .001). Viewed
another way, among those who indicated a lower aversion to
giving time (one standard deviation above the mean on the
preference measure), activating moral identity increased the
expectation of connection to aid recipients, b  0.83, t(233) 
Table 5
Study 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Amongst Independent and
Dependent Variables
Variable(s)
M SD A G RP MIC SC C DC
Independent variable(s)
A 21.35 4.38 —
G .05 —
RP 1.07 1.01 .12 .01 —
MIC .47 .50 .06 .11 .08 —
SC .48 .50 .04 .03 .06 .00 —
C .04 .14 .03 .10 .12 —
Dependent variables
DC 2.45 2.57 .07 .05 .06 .08 .36 .32 —
Note. A  Age; G  Gender; RP  Religious Participation; MIC  Moral Identity Condition; SC  Scarcity
Condition; C  Connection; DC  Donation Choice.
 p  .10.  p  .05.  p  .001.
Figure 3. Study 3: Activating moral identity causes people to prefer
giving time over money when time is scarce.
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10 REED, KAY, FINNEL, AQUINO, AND LEVY
1.94, p  .054, whereas among those who indicated a prefer-
ence for giving money (one standard deviation below the
mean), activating moral identity had no effect, b  0.44,
t(233)  1.34, ns (see Figure 4). Thus, activating moral
identity magnifies the benefits of giving time through expected
connection to aid recipients.
Discussion
Study 3 bolsters the evidence that moral identity reduces the
time aversion, yet it does so in the context of a psychological cost
that is almost universally experienced in the modern-day world:
time scarcity. This study also provides further evidence to high-
light the motivational forces behind the buffering effect of moral
identity on time aversion—in this instance, by demonstrating that
it enhances a perceived connection between moral agents and the
beneficiaries of their time donations. Taken together, this study
suggests that moral identity reduces time aversion even in the face
of perceived time scarcity, and that a motivating factor that drives
this effect is the desire for a felt connection between moral agents
and the beneficiaries of their efforts, even if those beneficiaries are
abstract and unspecified.
Although Study 3 helps clarify the effect of moral identity on time
aversion in the context of such an important real-world cost as time
scarcity, the scarcity manipulation in this study was admittedly heavy-
handed, as participants were told to imagine their time to be either
very scarce of very abundant. In everyday life, there are far more
gradients along the time scarcity continuum than these two polar
extremes, and this study lacks the ability to understand potential
nuances of time scarcity. Yet beyond any individual limitations of
Study 3, the ecological validity of all three studies so far further
suffers in a number of other respects. First, it suffers from the scale
used to measure the donation preference. In the real world, the
perceived choices of giving money or time (or neither) to a prosocial
cause are often mutually exclusive. That is, people often choose to
giver either money or time, or neither—not some combination
thereof. Second, these decisions are made by real people whose moral
identities occupy a more or less central place in their working self-
concepts, regardless of whether or not those identities are situationally
activated, and the studies so far have paid no attention to moral
identity as an individual difference variable. Third, all three studies
so far have examined expressed behavioral intentions, not actual
behavior. This is important, as what people say they will do may
be starkly different from what they actually do—especially when
it comes to prosocial behaviors involving real psychological costs.
Fourth, all three studies so far have asked the participants to assess
for themselves in the abstract the equivalency between their time
and a certain amount of money. In the real world, however, people
may not have such a finely tuned sense of the value equivalence of
time and money, so there is some question as to how equivalent
their value assessments really were. Fifth, none of the studies so
far have involved prosocial acts that specifically involved real
people; rather, they all involved prosocial organizations with in-
dividual beneficiaries who are assumed and unspecified. This may
be particularly important in considering the possibility that a desire
for human connection may be driving the effect of moral identity
on time aversion. Finally, although each of the previous studies
measured expected benefits of giving time, none measured the
actual benefits of doing so. In an attempt to account for all these
deficiencies and enhance the ecological validity of the research
presented in this article, we conducted a fourth study.
Study 4: A Chronically Salient Moral Identity Reduces
Time Aversion on Actual Behavior Especially As Real
Costs of Time Increase
Study Overview
Study 4 provides a behavioral test of our hypothesis that acti-
vating moral identity leads to a reduction in time aversion, espe-
cially when giving time is psychologically costly (previously
tested in Study 3). It also seeks to extend the findings of Studies 1
and 2 by examining the differential psychological benefits of
giving money versus time to prosocial causes. One hundred sixty-
three undergraduate business students participated in this study for
course credit.4 Seventy-nine participants were male, and their
average age was 20.37 years (SD  1.69). Participants were
4 Prior to analyzing the data, participants who failed a number of
screening criteria were eliminated from the data set. The first criterion was
whether a participant had spent too little time reading the description of the
palliative care organization and its role in the study. Prescreening revealed
that it was unlikely the participants could fully read and comprehend the
description in less than 20 s. Sixteen participants failed this criterion. The
second criterion was whether a participant had spent too little time reading
the description of the palliative care patient. Prescreening revealed that it
was unlikely the participants could fully read and comprehend the descrip-
tion in less than 30 s. Eleven participants failed this criterion. Third was
whether a participant had failed an attention check randomly embedded in
the postdonation follow-up questions. Three participants failed this crite-
rion. The final criterion was whether a participant had indicated that he or
she had any suspicion about the veracity of the study. In order to assist us
in probing possible suspicion about the letter-writing task, any participant
who opted not to donate time was automatically prompted by the survey to
explain why they chose not to do so. All participants were further asked at
the end of the survey to indicate what they thought the study was about.
Only two participants indicated any suspicion about the veracity of the
study. After eliminating participants who failed to meet any of our screen-
ing criteria, our final sample size was 139. While the analyses yield the
same conclusions (with even stronger statistical support) when we do not
exclude any of the participants, we nonetheless opted to exclude them in
order stay true to our screening criteria, as well as to eliminate as much
potential noise from our data as possible.
Figure 4. Study 3: Those who express a preference to give time versus
money feel more connected to aid recipients, particularly when moral
identity is activated.
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11MORAL IDENTITY & TIME AVERSION TO PROSOCIAL CAUSES
randomly assigned to one of two conditions (moral identity acti-
vated vs. not activated) and given the choice of donating $5 of real
money to a charitable organization or the equivalent value in time
performing a charitable act for an individual aid recipient. Two
months prior to the study, as part of a class they were required to
take, all participants completed a prequestionnaire that included a
measure of moral-identity centrality as well as other surveys
unrelated to this study.
Study 4 used a different method of manipulating psychological
cost than our previous study. Specifically, participants were asked
to donate varying amounts of time as a function of how much they
perceived their time to be worth at the very moment they were
doing the experimental task. Assessing the actual psychological
cost of their time at the point of decision is important because of
the significant implications time constraint can have on moral
behavior. People may have virtuous intentions in the abstract, but
when faced with time constraints in the real world, they can act in
a manner that diverges sharply from their otherwise laudable
intentions. As Darley and Batson (1973) showed, even seminary
students on their way to deliver a talk on the parable of the Good
Samaritan can be deterred from helping a shabbily dressed person
slumped by the side of the road by the mere fact that time is
constrained.
Because time is a scarce and nonrenewable resource, we expect
that the amount of time people are asked to donate would exert a
significant effect on their behavior. Simply put, the more time
people are asked to donate to a charitable cause, the less likely they
should be to do so. Instead, when given the option to donate a sum
of money that is equivalent to the value they place on their time,
they should be more willing to donate that money. However, based
on our theoretical model and the results of our previous findings,
we expect this effect to depend on (a) the extent to which their
moral identity is activated, and (b) the centrality of their moral
identity to begin with (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Felps, & Lim,
2009). In light of the findings from Study 3 that activating moral
identity leads people to be less aversive to giving time, we expect
the perceived cost of their time to counteract this effect. In other
words, the simple effect of preferring to give money as time
becomes costly will be neutralized by activating moral identity.
Importantly, this will occur regardless of whether or not one’s
moral identity is chronically accessible. However, we hypothesize
that when moral identity is not activated and this identity is not
salient within an individual’s working self-concept, then the psy-
chological cost of giving time will dominate the decision, thereby
resulting in a decreased willingness to give time over money,
especially as the amount of time in question increases. However, if
moral identity is chronically accessible, then even in the absence of
moral-identity activation, people will be as or more willing to give
time versus money, even when the cost of time increases. In other
words, a chronically accessible moral identity in a situation in
which moral identity is not made salient should allow people to
overcome the motivation to choose money over time, even as time
becomes more costly to give.
Moral-Identity Centrality Measure
We measured moral identity centrality with give items from
Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measure (see Appendix G) (  .80).
This was assessed 2 months prior to the time when participants
attended the lab to participate in this study. This procedure reduced
the likelihood that participants’ behavioral choices would be in-
fluenced by demand characteristics induced by completing the
moral-identity measure at the same time as their donation choice.
Moral-Identity Activation
As in Study 1, moral identity was temporarily activated (e.g.,
made situationally salient) using a writing task. The purpose of the
task was presented to participants as a way for the researchers to
“understand how different types of self-image affect the way
people tell stories about themselves.” The participants received the
same list of nine words as in Study 1 and were asked to write a
brief story in which they described themselves with each word at
least once. In the control condition, the participants were told that
the purpose of the task was to “understand how people relate to
objects in their environment when telling stories about them-
selves.” They received a list of nine common objects (i.e., book,
chair, desk) and were asked to write a brief story about themselves
invoking each object at least once. Upon finishing their story, the
participants completed a manipulation check in which they ex-
pressed their level of agreement with various statements about
their story (1  strongly disagree, 7  strongly agree). Results
revealed that participants in the moral-identity-activated (not-
activated) condition wrote stories that made them feel significantly
more (less) like moral people (MNotActivated  4.27, MActivated 
5.35), F(1, 161)  32.60, p  .001, p2  .17.
Real Donation Request
After completing the writing task, participants were told that this
research was being conducted in association with a charitable
organization in palliative care that needs two types of support: (a)
monetary donations, and (b) handwritten cards or letters to its
loneliest patients. The participants were then randomly assigned
one of two photos of patients purported to be in its care, together
with a description of their life history and medical condition (see
Appendix H for the patient descriptions; contact the authors for the
stimuli). They were told that receiving a handwritten card can
greatly lift the patient’s spirits and provide them much comfort and
solace in their final days.
The participants were then asked to indicate what hourly wage
they would need to be paid at that particular moment in time to
write a personalized card or letter to the patient. Upon entering
their required hourly wage, the participants were asked to reread
the moral-identity-activating (non-activating) story they wrote at
the beginning of the study. Those in the moral-identity-activation
condition were then asked to indicate what their story says about
their moral character, whereas those in the nonactivation condition
were asked to explain what their story says about the way they
relate to objects in their everyday environment. This procedure
was used to reinforce the moral-identity manipulation just prior to
their actual decision.
Participants were then presented with three options: (a) donate
the $5 they would have received for participating in the study to
the charitable organization, (b) spend $5 worth of their time
writing a card or letter to the palliative care patient in question, or
(c) donate neither the $5 nor the equivalent amount of time writing
to the patient. Those participants who opted either to donate $5 or
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12 REED, KAY, FINNEL, AQUINO, AND LEVY
nothing at all were instructed to continue with the survey. Those
who opted to write a card or letter, by contrast, were given writing
materials and instructed to write their card or letter by hand for the
appropriate amount of time. This amount of time was calculated
automatically by the computer, which converted the hourly wage
the participants had indicated they would need to do the task and
embedded the result into the donation choice itself (the formula for
this automatic conversion was 60  hourly wage  5). This made
the cost of the time donation both salient at and proximal to the
point in time when the participants were asked to make their
donation choice. It also resulted in the generation of a new vari-
able, which we refer to as time cost.
Postdonation Outcome Variables
As in Study 1, after making their donation choice the partici-
pants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with 10
statements about the extent to which their choice was self-
expressive (  .93). As in Study 2, participants were also asked
to indicate their level of agreement with four statements about how
connected their choice made them feel to the palliative care patient
(  .92). The name of the patient the participants were assigned
was automatically embedded into in each of the four items. Par-
ticipants were further asked to indicate their level of agreement
with three statements about the extent to which their choice made
them happy (  .96). Finally, the participants were asked to
indicate their level of agreement with three statements about the
extent to which their choice gave them a sense of meaning ( 
.92). For all of these statements, the participants’ specific donation
choice was automatically embedded into the statement itself.
Upon completing the study, participants who had chosen either
to write to the palliative care patient or donate neither money nor
time were given $5 in cash. Only those who had chosen to donate
money were not given $5 at the end of the study. After data
collection was completed, all participants were debriefed and the
money they donated was sent to the palliative care organization in
question. Because participants were informed in the debriefing that
the patient they wrote to was fictitious, a further $5 was also
donated to the palliative care organization on behalf of any par-
ticipant who chose to write a letter so that their efforts to help
alleviate the suffering of the terminally ill would not be in vain.
Results
Control variables. As with the previous studies, we con-
trolled for gender, age, and religious participation.
Donation preferences. Table 6 shows means, standard devi-
ations, and correlations among all study variables. Although we
presented the participants with three donation options (e.g., donate
money, give time, or neither), because we were primarily inter-
ested in the preference to donate time versus money, we further
excluded from our analysis those who chose to donate neither
money nor time (n  15). For all analyses in which donation
preference was the dependent variable, we only included those
participants who had chosen either to (a) donate money, or (b) give
time. As such, the donation preference variable was dichotomous
and we coded it accordingly (0  donate money, 1  give time).
Included among those who chose to give time was a number of
participants who went above and beyond the call of duty. Having
completed the writing task, seven participants indicated of their
own accord that they would like to donate the $5 they had earned
to the palliative care organization anyway. After having exhausted
the maximum allowable amount of time to write letters (as con-
strained by lab availability), a further six participants indicated a
desire to return to the lab on another occasion to complete their
allotted writing time. Four participants indicated a desire to do
both.
We predicted that activating moral identity leads to a reduction
in time aversion when giving time is psychologically costly, par-
ticularly among those with a chronically accessible moral identity.
In Study 4, psychological cost was operationalized in terms of the
varying amounts of time that participants were asked to give based
on how much they valued their time to conduct the task in question
just prior to the point of making their donation choice. Because
time is a nonrenewable and fixed resource, it is logical to assume
that giving up more of one’s time is more costly than giving up
less.
Table 6
Study 4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Amongst Independent and
Dependent Variables
Variable(s)
M SD G A RP MIC T I DC
Independent variable(s)
G .52 .50 —
A 20.48 1.82 .10 —
RP 1.85 1.12 .12 .06 —
MIC .48 .50 .002 .13 .04 —
T 64.47 91.71 .06 .06 .03 .11 —
I 6.09 .82 .15 .16 .02 .05 .07 —
Dependent variables
DC .50 .50 .18 .09 .01 .02 .09 .11 —
Note. G  Gender; A  Age; RP  Religious Participation; MIC  Moral Identity Condition; T  Time; I 
Internalization; DC  Donation Choice.
 p  .05.
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13MORAL IDENTITY & TIME AVERSION TO PROSOCIAL CAUSES
Because our dependent variable was dichotomous, we tested our
three-way interaction hypothesis using hierarchical logistic regres-
sion. We entered the control variables, main effects, and all pos-
sible higher order interactions into the model in separate steps so
that we could assess improvement in model fit as a result of adding
new predictors at each step. Table 7 shows the results of the logistic
regression. The results show that the model with the three-way inter-
action fits the data significantly better than the model in Step 2,
which does not include the three-way interaction (as indicated by
a chi-square statistic of the difference between 2 log likelihood
of each model), 	2(1)  26.26, p  .01. Because the moral-
identity centrality scores gathered over 2 months prior to the lab
study were unavailable for 12 of the participants who had not
already been eliminated under other criteria, these participants
were automatically excluded from this model. This, combined with
the elimination of those who had chosen to donate neither money
nor time, reduced the sample size from 139 to 114 for this
particular analysis.
We explored the pattern of the three-way interaction by exam-
ining the two-way interaction between the amount of time that
participants would have to spend on the writing task and moral-
identity centrality as measured by Aquino and Reed’s (2002)
Internalization scale. We did so for each of the moral identity
activated versus nonactivated conditions. We conducted separate
binary logistic regressions on the preference to donate money or
give time. In the moral-identity-activated condition, we found no
significant main or interaction effects. In contrast, in the moral-
identity-not-activated condition, we found a main effect of time
cost (b.49, p .05). More importantly, we found a significant
interaction between moral-identity centrality and time cost (b 
.07, p  .05) in this condition. We examined the pattern of the
two-way interaction with Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS software,
which allowed us to identify the incremental effects of the model
at different levels of time cost and moral-identity centrality. As can
be seen in Table 8 and Figure 5, time cost had an increasingly
negative effect on the decision to give time as moral-identity
centrality decreased. Only those nonactivated participants with the
most chronically accessible moral identities were indifferent be-
tween donating money and time.
These results show that those whose moral identities were
activated were essentially indifferent about the choice of whether
to donate money or give time, regardless of their level of moral-
identity centrality or time cost. However, when moral identity was
not activated, those who were low in moral-identity centrality were
significantly more likely to donate money than give time, espe-
cially as the cost of giving time increased. As moral-identity
centrality increased, however, participants were not as affected by
the cost of giving time. Indeed, they became steadily less aversive
to giving time—so much so that those at the highest levels of
moral-identity centrality even had a small and very close to sta-
Table 7
Study 4: Logistic Regression Model Estimation Results for Assessing Donating Money Versus Giving Time
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Predictor b
Wald chi
square OR b
Wald chi
square OR b
Wald chi
square OR
G .58 (.40) 2.11 1.78 .61 (.41) 2.26 1.84 .61 (.44) 1.93 1.83
A .07 (.12) .42 .93 .08 (.12) 0.40 .93 .20 (.15) 1.96 .82
RP 6.64
RP (1) .16 (.56) 0.08 0.85 .11 (.57) 0.04 0.90 .29 (.64) 0.20 .75
RP (2) .30 (.68) 0.20 1.35 .39 (.70) 0.32 148 .37 (.78) 0.23 1.45
RP (3) 1.14 (.81) 2.00 0.32 1.22 (.82) 2.22 0.30 1.89 (.91) 4.32 0.15
MIC .15 (.40) 0.14 1.16 4.41 (3.30) 1.79 82.08 –12.57 (6.47) 3.78 0.00
T .001 (.002) 0.21 1.00 .03 (.02) 1.85 0.97 .60 (.22) 7.79 0.55
I .21 (.25) 0.68 1.23 .16 (.37) 0.18 1.17 –2.05 (.86) 5.67 0.13
MIC  T .002 (.005) 0.18 1.00 .59 (.22) 7.51 1.81
MIC  I .66 (.54) 1.51 0.52 1.89 (.99) 3.62 6.63
T  I .005 (.004) 2.00 1.01 .09 (.03) 7.89 1.01
MIC  T  I .09 (.03) 7.65 0.92

R2 0.04 0.14
Nagelkerke R2 .09 0.13 0.27

–2LL 4.210 14.548
–2LL 150.501 146.291 131.743
	2 7.50 11.71 26.26
Note. N  114. OR  Odds Ratio; LL  Log Likelihood; G  Gender; A  Age; RP  Religious Participation; MIC  Moral Identity Condition; T 
Time; I  Internalization.
 p  .10.  p  .05.  p  .01.
Table 8
Study 4: Conditional Effect of Time Cost on Donation Choice at
Different Values of Moral Identity Centrality for
Nonactivation Condition
Moral identity centrality
percentile Effect (SE) LLCI UPCI
10% .157 (.068) .291 .023
25% .098 (.043) .183 .013
50% .040 (.019) .077 .002
75% .005 (.007) .009 .018
95% .019 (.010) .0003 .039
Note. N  60. SE  Standard Error; LLCI  Lower Level Confidence
Interval; UPCI  Upper Level Confidence Interval.
 p  .10.  p  .05.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
14 REED, KAY, FINNEL, AQUINO, AND LEVY
tistically significant preference to give time even as the cost of
doing so increased.
Postdonation outcome variables. In this study, we also ex-
amined several possible outcomes of donating time. As can be seen
in Table 9, we found that the choice of donating money over time
significantly enhanced scores across all postdonation outcome
variables measured. First, the decision to give time as opposed to
money made the participants feel that their choice had been sig-
nificantly more self-expressive, b 0.75, t(119) 3.38, p .001.
This decision explained a significant amount of the variance in
self-expression scores, R2  .25, F(4, 119)  11.18, p  .001.
Second, the decision to give time as opposed to money made the
participants feel that they were significantly more connected to the
patients, b  1.81, t(119)  8.07, p  .001. This decision ac-
counted for a large amount of the variance in perceived connection
scores, R2  .42, F(4, 119)  23.38, p  .001. Third, giving time
instead of money made the participants feel significantly happier,
b 0.79, t(119) 3.28, p .001. The decision to do so explained
a moderate amount of the variance in postdonation happiness
scores, R2  .15, F(4, 119)  6.53, p  .001. Finally, donating
time rather than money also gave the participants a sense that they
had done something significantly more meaningful, b  1.20,
t(119)  5.67, p  .001. This decision accounted for a large
proportion of the variance in postdonation meaningfulness scores,
R2  .33, F(4, 119)  16.37, p  .001.
Discussion
The results of Study 4 support our prediction and qualify the
findings of Study 3 by showing that activating moral identity
does not, in and of itself, reduce time aversion; rather, it reduces
the likelihood that people will prefer to give money over time,
especially as the cost of giving time increases. What Study 4
also shows is that in the absence of a situationally activated
moral identity, chronic accessibility of moral identity can still
play a similar role in regulating people’s preferences to give
Figure 5. In the nonmoral prime condition, moral identity centrality leads to a higher probability of giving
time, even as time cost increases. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
Table 9
Study 4: Multiple Regression Analysis on Donation Choice
Self-expressiveness Connection Happiness Meaningfulness
 (SE) t  (SE) t  (SE) t  (SE) t
G .57 (.17) 3.38 .51 (.23) 2.26 .67 (.24) 2.76 .84 (.21) 3.92
A .07 (.05) 1.60 .07 (.06) 1.12 .03 (.07) .43 .06 (.06) 1.06
RP .15 (.07) 2.09 .34 (.10) 3.48 .17 (.11) 1.61 .28 (.09) 2.43
DC .75 (.17) 4.48 1.81 (.22) 8.07 .79 (.24) 3.28 1.20 (.21) 5.67
Adjusted R2 .25 .42 .15 .33
F 11.18 23.38 6.53 16.37
df 4 4 4 4
N 123 123 123 123
Note. G  Gender; A  Age; RP  Religious Participation; DC  Donation Choice; SE  Standard Error; df  Degrees of Freedom.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
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15MORAL IDENTITY & TIME AVERSION TO PROSOCIAL CAUSES
money or time. Study 4 further shows that for those who opt to
give either time or money, giving time leads them to feel
significantly higher levels of self-expressiveness, social con-
nection, happiness, and meaningfulness. As a result, Study 4
furnishes direct behavioral evidence that time and money are
not psychologically equivalent, even though we tried to equate
their economic equivalence by heightening participants’ aware-
ness of the value of their time.
General Discussion
Giving time to a prosocial cause may have significant benefits,
but doing so also confers unique and significant psychological
costs. As a result, people generally have a significant aversion to
giving time to strangers or distant others. In light of the psycho-
logical benefits of giving time to prosocial causes, as well as the
socially desirable outcomes thereof, understanding the factors that
lessen this time aversion is an important and potentially fruitful
area of study. We have proposed that time aversion may be
reduced by considering the extent to which giving time may
reinforce identity—in particular, moral identity. In studying this
issue, this article brings together two growing research streams in
the social sciences: (a) the time-versus-money stream, and (b) the
identity-research stream. We build on previous work that has
examined the potency of moral identity to affect prosocial
behavior. For example, prior research has demonstrated that
moral identity motivates individuals to engage in prosocial
behavior when they consider their previous prosocial acts (Con-
way & Peetz, 2012), or when they otherwise engage in immoral
behavior (Mulder & Aquino, 2013). Moral identity has further
been shown to be an important factor in motivating volunteer-
ism over money donations (Winterich, Aquino, Mittal, &
Swartz, 2013). Finally, moral identity has been shown to be a
key factor in motivating high-organizational status individuals
to report intentions to give time over money to a community
service organization (Reed et al., 2007, Study 2, p. 186). In that
study, time was assumed to be a particularly costly resource for
high-organizational-status individuals (e.g., executives and
upper-level managers). This suggests that moral identity may
have an important role to play in motivating costly giving. We
extend this body of research by exploring the impact of moral
identity on reducing time aversion in the face of directly ma-
nipulated, increasingly onerous psychological costs.
Our studies have yielded several tentative conclusions. First,
exposure to a moral cue reduces time aversion toward a prosocial
cause, and this is related to an expectation that giving time over
money is a stronger signal of self-expression (Study 1). Second,
exposure to a moral cue causes people to view unpleasant volun-
teering tasks as less unpleasant, thereby leading them to report
higher intentions to give time to a prosocial cause (Study 2). Third,
not only do people expect to feel more connected to aid recipients
when they think about giving time compared with money, but
exposure to a moral cue reduces their time aversion even when
they expect their time to be scarce (Study 3). Finally, in a test of
real behavior, we find that the chronic salience of moral identity is
a factor that reduces time aversion, even and especially as actual
costs (scarcity) of time increase (Study 4). These findings are
consistent with and extend previous research that identifies moral
identity as an important factor in the self-regulation of pro- and
antisocial behavior (Aquino et al., 2009; Reynolds & Ceranic,
2007).
Implications for Time-Versus-Money Research
Time-versus-money research has touted the benefits of giving
time relative to money. Compared with activating money, priming
time makes people like products more (Mogilner & Aaker, 2009),
leads people to engage in happiness promoting behaviors (Mogil-
ner, 2010), and boosts charitable giving (Liu & Aaker, 2008).
Activating time also fosters interpersonal connection by leading
people to spend time with loved ones (Mogilner, 2010). Giving
time is also associated with happiness (Mogilner, 2010). Even
though giving money has benefits (Aknin et al., 2011; Dunn et al.,
2011; Dunn & Norton, 2013), by contrast, making people think
about money encourages people to be more independent and less
reliant on others (Vohs et al., 2008). Thinking about money actu-
ally causes people to engage in more immoral behavior (Gino &
Mogilner, 2014). Our studies complement the existing time-
versus-money literature, finding that individuals who give time
feel more connected to aid recipients and derive a greater sense of
meaning from their actions. That people feel giving time leads to
both a felt sense of connection and meaning is perhaps not coin-
cidental, as bonding is nurtured by meaningful social interaction,
which, in turn, increases social capital (Putnam, 2000). That
money is a fungible commodity that people are prepared to trade
with just about anybody suggests that it may not nurture a felt
sense of meaningful exchange—even though the act itself helps
those who receive the money. Therefore, that time is a unique and
precious resource about which we are more discerning in our
expenditures indicates that it may be tied to a heightened sense of
social meaning. Given the heightened value people place on their
time, we further add to prior research by arguing that giving time
can have costs that giving money does not, and by showing that
even, and indeed especially, as these costs increase, moral identity
can serve to reduce time aversion (see Oyserman, 2009).
Implications for Identity Research
Identity research focuses on identity-based motivation. That is,
activating an identity motivates people to think, feel, and behave in
ways consistent with that identity (Coleman & Williams, 2013;
Oyserman, 2009). Moral identity has been shown to be a potent
motivator, encouraging people to act in ways that further the
welfare of others (Aquino et al., 2009). This article supports that
prior work, finding that when the costs of giving time are high,
people need exposure to moral cues—or alternatively a chroni-
cally salient moral identity—to help them overcome their time
aversion. Study 2 suggests that activating moral identity may work
in part because it changes perceptions of how unpleasant giving
time may be. In that study, giving time was manipulated to be
either low or high on unpleasantness. Compared with those whose
moral identity had not been activated, those whose moral identity
had been activated viewed the high-unpleasantness task as less
unpleasant. This lower perceived unpleasantness then drove their
self-reported preference to give more time. Study 3 suggests that
moral identity may further help people overcome time aversion by
eliciting an expectation of felt connection to the beneficiary of
their efforts. In that study, giving time was manipulated to be done
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under conditions of either perceived time scarcity or abundance.
Compared with those in the control condition, those whose moral
identity was primed were better able to overcome their time
aversion.
This evidence is consistent with recent research on identity and
emotion regulation, which finds that identities are associated with
specific emotions, which people want to match to their activated
identities (Cameron & Payne, 2012; Coleman & Williams, 2013).
For example, activating athletic identity has been shown to moti-
vate individuals to experience anger (so that they are pumped up
and ready to compete) in a positive light. As a result, they attend
more to anger-inducing stimuli and upregulate this otherwise neg-
ative emotion to reverse the “anger aversion” tendency (e.g., by
choosing angry songs to listen to when they work out; Coleman &
Williams, 2013, Experiment 2, p. 210). Moral identity may be
motivating a similar form of strategic attention deployment in our
studies (see Coleman & Williams, 2013; also Reynolds, 2008). For
example, as in Study 2, participants who were exposed to a moral
cue reported less unpleasantness associated with an unpleasant
task. These findings present intriguing avenues for future research
that complement previous work on moral identity and emotions
(Aquino, McFerran, & Laven, 2011), such as empathy and com-
passion (Cameron & Payne, 2012; Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer,
2008; Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner,
2012).
We have shown that moral identity reduces the aversion to give
time, and to facilitate this, individuals may either focus on the
pleasant aspects of an otherwise unpleasant volunteering task or an
expectation of a felt connection to the beneficiary of their efforts.
The findings of Studies 3 and 4 are consistent with this idea and
suggest that people whose moral identities are either primed or
chronically accessible are not only motivated to give more time but
also feel more gratified when they do so. However, the fact that
people actually feel more gratified by giving time irrespective of
their moral identity (Study 4) also suggests that doing so may
appeal to an innate compulsion to give time in order to help others,
despite the psychological costs incurred by doing so. Therefore, it
may be that this effect may be driven by the anticipated sense of
self-expression and connection that those with an activated moral
identity feel they will derive from giving time. Yet ironically,
regardless of what people expect to feel before giving time, our
studies show that in actuality they experience higher levels of
connection, meaning, self-expression, and happiness when they
choose to do so (Study 4).
Implications for Public Charities and Public Policy
This research has substantive implications for charities seeking
donations of time rather than money (Aaker et al., 2011; Mogilner,
2010). For example, asking people how much time they will give
to charity has been shown to draw their attention to how happy
they will feel if they contribute. As a result, a “time-ask” effect is
created by which they give more of both money and time to charity
(Liu & Aaker, 2008). In light of our findings concerning the
motivational power of moral identity in overcoming time aversion,
it may be that activating moral identity would further magnify this
time-ask effect. That is, asking people how much time they would
like to give may be a particularly potent way of increasing tem-
poral contributions to charity when moral identity is activated. In
addition to showing that giving time makes people happier, our
research suggests that giving time—whether hypothetically or in
reality—makes people feel more self-expressive.
Our research also suggests that charities need to consider how
psychologically costly giving time is for their target audience. If
giving time is relatively low cost, then one would think that
virtually all potential donors would opt to give (some) time.
However, this research (Study 4) suggests that although those with
a less chronically salient moral identity may be willing to give time
when the cost of doing so is low, those with a highly central moral
identity may be less motivated to do so. Conversely, as the cost of
giving time rises, those with a less chronically salient moral
identity become far more aversive to giving time, whereas those
with a highly central moral identity become more motivated to do
so. Therefore, if charities wish to recruit volunteers for low time-
cost tasks, they may be better off targeting individuals whose
moral identities occupy a less central role within their self-concept.
Conversely, if they wish to recruit volunteers for tasks with a high
time cost, they may do well to target individuals whose moral
identities occupy a more central role in their self-concept. As such,
charities seeking donations of time may want to consider moral
identity in their promotional materials and distribute those mate-
rials to the people known to have different levels of chronic moral
salience.
Conclusion
Few studies have explored how the tradeoff of both positive
(self-expressivity, connectedness, meaningfulness and happiness)
and negative (unpleasantness, scarcity, etc.) psychological out-
comes of giving time motivates people to do so even though an
easier route (giving money) may also be available. The studies in
this article contribute to this emerging literature. By bridging the
gap between the time-versus-money and identity-research streams,
we begin to answer the questions of why and when moral identity
reduces time aversion in giving resources to prosocial causes.
References
Aaker, J., Rudd, M., & Mogilner, C. (2011). If money doesn’t make you
happier, consider time. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21, 126–130.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2011.01.004
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and
interpreting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Aknin, L. B., Sandstrom, G. M., Dunn, E. W., & Norton, M. I. (2011). It’s
the recipient that counts: Spending money on strong social ties leads to
greater happiness than spending on weak social ties. PLoS ONE, 6(2),
e17018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0017018
Alderfer, C. P. (1969). An empirical test of a new theory of human needs.
Organizational Behavior & Human Performance, 4, 142–175. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(69)90004-X
Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., Felps, W., & Lim, V. K. (2009).
Testing a social-cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive
influence of situations and moral identity centrality. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 97, 123–141. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
a0015406
Aquino, K., McFerran, B., & Laven, M. (2011). Moral identity and the
experience of moral elevation in response to acts of uncommon good-
ness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 703–718.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0022540
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
17MORAL IDENTITY & TIME AVERSION TO PROSOCIAL CAUSES
Aquino, K., & Reed, A., II. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1423–1440. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423
Ashmore, R. D., Deaux, K., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2004). An organiz-
ing framework for collective identity: Articulation and significance of
multidimensionality. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 80–114. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1037/0033-2909.130.1.80
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable
distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and
statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
51, 1173–1182. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1173
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for
interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 117, 497–529.
Blasi, A. (1984). Moral identity: Its role in moral functioning. In W.
Kurtines & J. Gewirtz, (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior and moral
development (pp. 128–139). New York: Wiley.
Cameron, D. C. & Payne, K. B. (2012). The cost of callousness: Regulating
compassion influence the moral self-concept. Psychological Science, 23,
225–229.
Carter, T. J., & Gilovich, T. (2010). The relative relativity of material and
experiential purchases. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
98, 146–159. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0017145
Coleman, N. V., & Williams, P. (2013). Feeling like my self: Emotion
profiles and social identity. Journal of Consumer Research, 40, 203–
222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/669483
Conway, P., & Peetz, J. (2012). When does feeling moral actually make
you a better person? Conceptual abstraction moderates whether past
moral deeds motivate consistency or compensatory behavior. Personal-
ity and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 907–919. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0146167212442394
Darley, J. M., & Batson, C. D. (1973). From Jerusalem to Jericho: A study
of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 100–108. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/h0034449
Detert, J. R., Treviño, L. K., & Sweitzer, V. L. (2008). Moral disengage-
ment in ethical decision making: A study of antecedents and outcomes.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 374–391. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
0021-9010.93.2.374
DeVoe, S. E., & Pfeffer, J. (2007). Hourly payment and volunteering: The
effect of organizational practices on decisions about time use. Academy
of Management Journal, 50, 783–798. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/AMJ
.2007.26279171
Dunn, E. W., Aknin, L. B., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Spending money on
others promotes happiness. Science, 319, 1687–1688. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1126/science.1150952
Dunn, E. W., Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2011). If money doesn’t
make you happy, then you probably aren’t spending it right. Journal of
Consumer Psychology, 21, 115–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps
.2011.02.002
Dunn, E. W., & Norton, M. I. (2013). Happy money: The science of
smarter spending. New York, NY: Simon & Shuster.
Finnel, S., Reed, A., II., & Aquino, K. (2011). Promoting multiple policies
to the public: The difficulties of simultaneously promoting war and
foreign humanitarian aid. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 30,
246–263. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jppm.30.2.246
Foa, E. B., & Foa, U. G. (1980). Resource theory: Interpersonal behavior
in exchange. In K. J. Gergen, M. S. Greenberg, & R. H. Willis (Eds.),
Social exchange: Advances in theory and research (pp. 77–101). New
York: Plenum Press.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Gino, F., & Mogilner, C. (2014). Time, money, and morality. Psychological
Science, 25, 414–421. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797613506438
Goodwin, G. P., Piazza, J., & Rozin, P. (2014). Moral character predom-
inates in person perception and evaluation. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 106, 148–168. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0034726
Graham, J., Meindl, P., & Beall, E. (2012). Integrating the streams of
morality research: The case of political ideology. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 21, 373–377. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0963721412456842
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and condi-
tional process analysis: A regression-based approach. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Higgins, E. T. (1996). The “self digest”: Self-knowledge serving self-
regulatory functions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71,
1062–1083. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.6.1062
Irwin, J. R., & McClelland, G. H. (2001). Misleading heuristics and
moderated multiple regression models. Journal of Marketing Research,
38, 100–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.1.100.18835
Kleine, R. E., III., Kleine, S. S., & Kernan, J. B. (1993). Mundane
consumption and the self: A social identity perspective. Journal of
Consumer Psychology, 2, 209–235. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1057-
7408(08)80015-0
Kraus, M. W., Piff, P. K., Mendoza-Denton, R., Rheinschmidt, M. L., &
Keltner, D. (2012). Social class, solipsism, and contextualism: How the
rich are different from the poor. Psychological Review, 119, 546–572.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028756
Laverie, D. A., Kleine, R. E., III., & Kleine, S. S. (2002). Reexamination and
extension of Kleine, Kleine and Kernan’s social identity model of mundane
consumption: The mediating role of the appraisal process. Journal of
Consumer Research, 28, 659–669. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/338208
Levine, R. N. (2008). A geography of time: On tempo, culture, and the
pace of life. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Liu, W., & Aaker, J. (2008). The happiness of giving: The time-ask effect.
Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 543–557. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/
588699
McClelland, D. C. (1961). The achieving society. Princeton, NJ: D. Van
Nostrand. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14359-000
Mogilner, C. (2010). The pursuit of happiness: Time, money, and social
connection. Psychological Science, 21, 1348–1354. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0956797610380696
Mogilner, C., & Aaker, J. (2009). The time vs. money effect: Shifting
product attitudes and decisions through personal connection. Journal of
Consumer Research, 36, 277–291. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/597161
Mogilner, C., Chance, Z., & Norton, M. I. (2012). Giving time gives you
time. Psychological Science, 23, 1233–1238. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0956797612442551
Mulder, L. B., & Aquino, K. (2013). The role of moral identity in the aftermath
of dishonesty. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
121, 219–230. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.03.005
Muller, D., Judd, C. M., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2005). When moderation is
mediated and mediation is moderated. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 89, 852–863.
Myers, D. G. (2000). The American paradox: Spiritual hunger in an age of
plenty. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Okada, E. M., & Hoch, S. J. (2004). Spending time versus spending money.
Journal of Consumer Research, 31, 313–323. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/
422110
Oyserman, D. (2007). Social identity and self-regulation. In A. W. Krug-
lanski & E. Tory Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic
principles (2nd ed., pp. 432–453). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Oyserman, D. (2009). Identity-based motivation: Implications for action-
readiness, procedural readiness, and consumer behavior. Journal of
Consumer Psychology, 19, 250–260.
Paulhus, D. (1989). Measurement and control of response bias. In J. P.
Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures of social
psychological attitudes (pp. 17–59). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
18 REED, KAY, FINNEL, AQUINO, AND LEVY
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American
community. New York, NY: Touchstone. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/
358916.361990
Reed, A., II. (2004). Activating the self-importance of consumer selves:
Exploring identity salience effects on judgments. Journal of Consumer
Research, 31, 286–295. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/422108
Reed, A., II., & Aquino, K. F. (2003). Moral identity and the expanding circle of
moral regard toward out-groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
84, 1270–1286. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.6.1270
Reed, A., II., Aquino, K., & Levy, E. (2007). Moral identity and judgments
of charitable behaviors. Journal of Marketing, 71, 178–193. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.71.1.178
Reynolds, S. J. (2008). Moral attentiveness: Who pays attention to the
moral aspects of life? Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 1027–1041.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.93.5.1027
Reynolds, S. J., & Ceranic, T. L. (2007). The effects of moral judgment and
moral identity on moral behavior: An empirical examination of the
moral individual. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 1610–1624. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.6.1610
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facili-
tation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American
Psychologist, 55, 68–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68
Saini, R., & Monga, A. (2008). How I decide depends on what I spend: Use
of heuristics is greater for time than for money. Journal of Consumer
Research, 34, 914–922. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/525503
Solomon, M. R. (1983). The role of products as social stimuli: A symbolic
interactionism perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 10, 319–
329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/208971
Tett, R. P., & Burnett, D. D. (2003). A personality trait-based interactionist
model of job performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 500–517.
Van Boven, L., & Gilovich, T. (2003). To do or to have? That is the
question. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 1193–1202.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.6.1193
Vohs, K. D., Mead, N. L., & Goode, M. R. (2008). Merely activating the
concept of money changes personal and interpersonal behavior. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 17, 208–212. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1467-8721.2008.00576.x
Winterich, K. P., Aquino, K., Mittal, V., & Swartz, R. (2013). When moral
identity symbolization motivates prosocial behavior: The role of recog-
nition and moral identity internalization. Journal of Applied Psychology,
98, 759–770. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0033177
Zauberman, G., & Lynch, J. G., Jr. (2005). Resource slack and propensity
to discount delayed investments of time versus money. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 23–37. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/0096-3445.134.1.23
Zhou, X., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2009). The symbolic power
of money: Reminders of money alter social distress and physical pain.
Psychological Science, 20, 700–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02353.x
Appendix A
Study 1: Writing Task Used to Manipulate Moral Identity Activation
The purpose of this exercise is to examine people’s handwriting
styles as they tell stories. There is no right or wrong way of
writing, so just relax and write in your natural style.
Listed below are nine words in alphabetical order.
Please take a few moments (about 5–10 seconds per word) to
think about what each word means to you. Then follow the
“Example” and write down each word 4 times in the boxes
provided.
Moral Identity Activated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Example Example Example Example Example
Caring
Compassionate
Fair
Friendly
Generous
Hardworking
Helpful
Honest
Kind
(Appendices continue)
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Moral Identity Not Activated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Example Example Example Example Example
Carefree
Compatible
Favorable
Generally
Happy
Harmless
Open-Minded
Polite
Respectable
Now take a few moments to think about each of these words. In
the box below, write a brief story about yourself (one or two
paragraphs) which uses each of these words at least once. It may
help if you visualize each word as it is relevant to your life.
Appendix B
Study 1: Moral-Cause Manipulation
Moral-Cause Condition
The AMA is soliciting help in developing a socially aware grass-
roots level community campaign (e.g., public service announcements)
to raise awareness of the need for college students to get involved
early in volunteer activities and long-term activist goals (e.g., human
rights and to help others in need in this country).
Non Moral-Cause Condition
The AMA is soliciting help in developing an advertisement and
persuasive communication campaign (e.g., magazine ads and bill-
boards) to promote and ultimately sell marketing related services
to different companies in industry who may require assistance
(e.g., to help companies gather and organize research, etc.).
Appendix C
Studies 1 and 4: Self-Expressiveness, Connectedness, and Happiness/Meaningfulness Measures
Participating in this fundraising effort would:
1  Strongly Disagree, 7  Strongly Agree
Self-Expressiveness:
Gives me a lot of intrinsic satisfaction
Feels like it was my voluntary choice
Feels like it was the right thing to do
Is deeply involving for me
Makes me feel good
Reflects the type of person that I am
Represents the kind of activity I often think about
Is an important priority for me
Represents “who I am”
Is a natural thing for me to do
Connectedness:
Makes me feel closely connected to the people who will
benefit from __.
Makes me feel like I really understand the people who will
benefit from __.
Makes me feel emotionally tied to the people who will benefit
from __.
Creates a strong bond between me and the people who will
benefit from __.
(Appendices continue)
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Happiness Meaningfulness:
Volunteering/donating made me happy.
I felt happy to volunteer/donate.
I felt happy as I was volunteering/donating.
Volunteering/donating gave me a sense of meaning.
I felt that I was doing something meaningful as I was volun-
teering/donating.
I felt that I was doing something meaningful at the moment I
decided to volunteer/donate.
Appendix D
Study 2: Unpleasantness-of-Giving-Time Manipulation
Giving Time High on Unpleasantness
If you volunteered time, you would go from one patient bedroom to another, feeding severely ill patients
and replacing dirty urine cups and bedpans. This means you would spoon feed the patients, talking to them,
wiping saliva and food from their mouths, and cleaning if they spit up or vomit as they were eating. As you
fed them, you would try not to stare, even if they had highly visible wounds or symptoms of illness. When
you were done feeding each patient, you would replace his or her dirty bedside urine cups and bedpans with
clean ones. You would take the dirty ones to a designated area, where hospital staff would clean them. You
would spend 1 hour volunteering for the Hospital in this way.
Giving Time Low on Unpleasantness
If you volunteered time, you would go from one patient bedroom to another tidying up and putting items
in their proper place. For example, doctors sometimes leave patient charts on patients’ tables or chairs rather
than putting them at the room entrance or at the foot of patients’ beds, and visitors sometimes move chairs
from one room to another without putting them back. You would put these things back where they belong,
based on hospital staff’s instructions. If patients were awake when you entered their rooms, you would say
hello. If they were asleep, you would work quietly and try not to disturb them. You would spend 1 hour
volunteering for the Hospital in this way.
Appendix E
Study 3: Scarcity Manipulation
Time Scarce and Money Abundant
Imagine that you are a student. This semester, you got an on campus job that pays very well. As a result,
you have a lot of spare money. Also this semester, you are taking hard classes that require a lot of studying.
As a result, you have some but not a lot of spare time.
Time Abundant and Money Scarce
Imagine that you are a student. This semester, you got an on campus job that pays very poorly. As a result,
you have some but not a lot of spare money. Also this semester, you are taking easy classes that require very
little studying. As a result, you have a lot of spare time.
(Appendices continue)
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Appendix F
Study 3: Connection Measure
1  Completely Disagree, 7  Completely Agree
1. After making this choice, I would feel very connected to the people benefiting from Global Fund
aid.
2. After making this choice, I would feel close to the people I was helping.
Appendix G
Study 4: Moral-Identity Centrality Measure
Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person:
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in
your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and
act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following questions.
I  Internalization; S  Symbolization; R  Reverse Coded.
(I) 1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.
(I) 2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
(S) 3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.
(I) 4. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics. (R)
(S) 5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics.
(S) 6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics.
(I) 7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me. (R)
(S) 8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations.
(S) 9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics.
(I) 10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.
Appendix H
Study 4: Palliative Care Patient Information
Jim Robinson is 82 years old and lives alone in a small home in Burnaby. Jim was born in 1932 in Kitimat,
a small mining town in northern British Columbia. Jim’s father worked in the aluminum processing factories.
His mother was a housewife. When Jim was 10 years old, his mother died of pneumonia. With his father
working long hours in the factory, Jim was left as primary caretaker for his two younger siblings. After
working the aluminum factories for many years, Jim moved to Vancouver in 1963 to become a fisherman.
Shortly thereafter Jim met the love of his life, Maureen. Jim and Maureen were married two years later. They
had two children, Frank and Jessica. Sadly, Maureen and Jessica were killed in 1974 by a drunk driver. Jim
continued to raise Frank as a single father. In 1984, however, Frank moved away to go to university, leaving
Jim all alone. Frank became a chemical engineer and has since worked for oil companies all over the world.
As a result, Jim has not been able to maintain a close relationship with Frank and has never gotten to know
his grandchildren. Jim suffered a severe stroke two years ago, leaving the left side of his body paralyzed. More
recently, Jim was diagnosed with colon cancer and given six months to live. While Jim has two good friends,
he only receives a visit once every few weeks. As Jim deteriorates, he is increasingly reliant on the BCHPCS
for basic care. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
(Appendices continue)
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John Pritchard is 88 years old and lives alone in a small run-down condominium in Coquitlam. John was
born an only child in 1927 in Toronto. John’s father was a successful stock broker and his mother was a
housewife. Until 1929 John’s family was among the wealthiest in Toronto; however, when the market crash
of 1929 hit they lost everything. Unable to cope, John’s father committed suicide, leaving John and his mother
to fend for themselves. John’s mother moved them across the country to British Columbia to work as a laborer
in the orchards of the Okanagan. Soon thereafter John’s mother found a new husband, a real estate agent from
Vancouver. Instead of getting a new father, however, John got an abusive alcoholic who beat him regularly.
At the age of 16 John joined the army to get away from his step father. One year later, he was sent over to
Europe where he stormed the beaches at Normandy. Although he survived, he was badly wounded and
returned home from the war partially crippled and psychologically damaged. Ever since, John has never been
able to lead a normal life. He has spent much of his adult life dealing with depression, moving in and out of
psychiatric wards, on and off the streets. When his mother passed away in 1985, John received a small
inheritance, which he used to buy the condominium he lives in now. John has been suffering from Parkinson’s
disease for many years, and he is now in its final stages. He has no friends and no family, and is now
completely dependent on the BCHCPS to care for him. See the online article for the color version of this
figure.
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